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ABSTRACT
The understanding of family businesses from the family side is
still in its infancy. This is especially true in relation to how family
members manage their relationships with one another and with
the firm. Family growth and evolution are usually accompanied
by a reduction in shared family meaning and purpose and greater
divergence in the form of factional interests and intentions that
harm the family and the firm. To counterbalance this negative
impact, scholars generally advocate a set of corporate governance
practices. However, few papers have analysed how family regula-
tory frameworks and family governance institutions affect family
firm performance. To the best of our knowledge, no paper has
analysed the complementary role of family rules and family gov-
ernance institutions or their relationship with business perform-
ance. To fill this gap, we examine how family rules and family
governance institutions affect firm performance. Drawing upon
the concept of fit from organisation design, this paper shows the
complementary role of family rules and family institutions, as well
as the need for fit with family complexity. Analysis of a sample of
family businesses shows that when family governance fits with
family complexity, the relationship with firm performance is posi-
tive; any misfit leads to negative consequences.
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Two decades ago, Lansberg (1999) reported the negative role of family complexity in
family and business outcomes. Since then, considerable research has focused on docu-
menting the consequences of and providing practices to deal with the complexity
derived from the evolution of the owner family. Lansberg (1999) observed that family
businesses evolve over time and through succession processes. This evolution leads to
increasingly complex systems. Lansberg (1999) proposed the concept of family
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complexity. This concept is defined as the number of family members and the kind
of relationships amongst them, as well as the number of generations involved in the
family business. Subsequently, Gimeno-Sandig et al. (2006) and Gimeno-Sandig et al.
(2010) established a clear differentiation between business complexity and family
complexity and proposed a model of fit to manage the risk resulting from each kind
of complexity.
With regard to the consequences of family complexity, studies have shown that
diluted ownership and low emotional commitment to the business (Vilaseca, 2002)
cause divergence and reduce cohesion (Montemerlo, 2005). Moreover, research on
the relationship between levels of family complexity and financial and non-financial
performance has revealed a negative and significant impact (De Massis et al., 2013;
2014; Mazzola et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2013).
As a way of managing the risk resulting from this kind of complexity, the litera-
ture proposes that a normative framework should be developed and formalised to
regulate the relationship between the family and the business. The most popular form
is the family constitution. The literature also highlights a structure of institutional
mechanisms, such as family assemblies and family councils, as a way of promoting
family communication and interaction (Aronoff & Ward, 2016; Gimeno-Sandig et al.,
2006, 2010; Montemerlo, 2005; M€uhlebach, 2005).
However, the dominant logic in the mainstream literature is a corporate govern-
ance approach, proposing a set of institutions and practices aimed at managing and
reducing agency costs and blockholder conflicts (Carney et al., 2014; Zellweger &
Kammerlander, 2015). Surprisingly, some of the family business literature presents a
paradox: on the one hand, it proposes the management of family conflict by adopting
a purely corporate governance logic, whilst on the other, it states that family busi-
nesses are driven by a different mindset as regards intention, vision, decision making
and performance assessment criteria (Gomez-Mejıa et al., 2007; Kotlar & De Massis,
2013). A consequence is scant research that assesses the impact of family regulatory
frameworks (e.g. the family constitution) or family governance institutions (e.g. a
family assembly or a family council) on family business performance (Li & Daspit,
2016; Suess, 2014). In fact, few studies have considered how proper systems of family
governance can counterbalance the negative effects of family complexity (Lambrecht
& Lievens, 2008) and take advantage of the resources provided by a wide and diverse
family group (Gonzalez-Cruz & Cruz-Ros, 2016).
To address this gap, this paper analyses the impact of family rules and family gov-
ernance institutions on family business performance, considering the degree of family
complexity. The analysis focuses on the family and on how family governance affects
business performance. The paper draws on the concept of fit, a key concept in organ-
isation design, and builds on the contingent model of fit proposed by Gimeno-Sandig
et al. (2006, 2010). Based on this approach, it tests the proposition that the impact of
the family governance system on business performance depends on the internal fit of
the elements that make up the family governance system and on the external fit with
the contingency of family complexity. Any misfit is expected to lead to negative
effects on performance. The analysis is based on a sample of 378 Spanish family busi-
nesses in the tourism industry.
2 T. GONZÁLEZ-CRUZ ET AL.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. Section 2 succinctly presents the
theoretical framework that supports the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the fieldwork,
sample and operationalisation of the research variables. Section 4 presents the method
and results based on panel regressions. Finally, Section 5 offers conclusions and
recommendations.
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses
As noted by Jaskiewicz and Dyer (2017), there is a need to consider the stages, fea-
tures and challenges of the evolution of the owner family from the family side, not
only from a managerial point of view. Since Lansberg (1999) identified the concept of
family complexity, the family business literature has focused on managing family
complexity using a corporate governance approach, which relies on two main streams
of research. First, exponents of agency theory propose how to protect the firm from
owner family faultlines and conflicts (Zellweger & Kammerlander, 2015). Second,
adherents of stewardship theory and socioemotional wealth theory focus on how to
channel the family logic and its specific goals into the business project (Madison
et al., 2016; Vandekerkhof et al., 2018; Villalonga et al., 2015).
Surprisingly, research from the perspective of family logic (i.e. focusing on family
governance) is less developed than research from a corporate governance approach.
Similarly, the literature on family governance frequently focuses on specific events,
mainly CEO succession (Brenes et al., 2006; Breton-Miller et al., 2004; Gilding et al.,
2015). To the best of our knowledge, few papers have analysed how to manage family
complexity through a family governance system, which is understood here as a com-
plementary set of rules and institutions. Similarly, few papers have studied the impact
of family governance on firm performance (Arteaga & Menendez-Requejo, 2017).
To fill this gap, we first present the concepts that support the underlying theoret-
ical framework of this paper, namely the model of fit proposed by Gimeno-Sandig
et al. (2006, 2010). The concept of fit comes from information processing theory
(Burton et al., 2002, 2003; Egelhoff, 1991; Galbraith, 1974; Keller, 1994; Tushman &
Nadler, 1978), a cornerstone of organisation design. Over the next few pages, we pre-
sent the literature on family business complexity. Our aim is to state and support a
set of hypotheses that link the development of the family governance system to family
firm performance. We also distinguish between the two main spheres of the family
governance system: the family regulatory framework and the family governance struc-
ture. We show the systemic interdependence of these two spheres.
2.1. Family complexity from the approach of fit
According to organisation design theorists, fit refers to the alignment of the organisa-
tion’s features to address a contingency factor such as uncertainty (Burns & Stalker,
1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) or size (Child, 1975). The resulting organisation
design is the most suitable one in the sense that it enables the organisation to meet
its goals and achieve high performance.
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The theoretical foundation of this conceptualisation of fit is based on information
processing theory (Galbraith, 1974). According to information processing theory, con-
tingencies are an information processing requirement, with organisational structure
providing the information processing capacity to meet that requirement (Burton
et al., 2002, 2003; Egelhoff, 1991; Keller, 1994; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). A fit occurs
when the information processing capacity matches the information processing
requirement. If the information processing capacity is not equal to the information
processing requirement, there is a misfit, which leads to underperformance. Later,
organisation scholars coined two types of misfit: over-fit and under-fit (Klaas et al.,
2006; Klaas & Donaldson, 2009; Naman & Slevin, 1993). Over-fit happens when the
structural development is greater than the amount required by the contingency vari-
able, so it is essentially a waste of resources. On the contrary, under-fit occurs when
the level of structural development is lower than the amount required by the contin-
gency variable, which causes organisational disability. The same scholars state that
both over-fit and under-fit negatively affect performance.
In relation to family businesses, Gimeno-Sandig et al. (2006, 2010) proposed a
model of fit where the resulting variable is the level of structural risk of the family
business and where the amount of risk depends on the misfit between the accumu-
lated level of business and family complexity and the level of structural development.
This structural development depends on institutionalisation, appropriate family and
business separation, best practices (including formalisation and explicit rules), com-
munication practices and succession management.
Recent research (Gonzalez-Cruz & Cruz-Ros, 2016) has provided empirical evi-
dence supporting the utility of the model of fit proposed by Gimeno-Sandig et al.
(2006, 2010) in managing structural risk. However, these results are based solely on
the business side of the model, and those scholars have called for future research to
shed light on the consequences of over-fit.
To help fill this gap, this research looks to the family side of the model. From this
approach, we analyse the misfit between family complexity and the structural devel-
opment specifically aimed at dealing with this complexity, and we examine its effect
on performance. The family business literature proposes managing family complexity
by developing specific structural artefacts. Examples include the formalisation of a
normative framework that regulates the relationship between the family and the busi-
ness. The literature also proposes the use of a set of institutional mechanisms, such as
family assemblies and family councils, that promote family communication and inter-
action (Montemerlo, 2005; M€uhlebach, 2005). The next sub-section briefly presents
the contingency considered in this study (i.e. family complexity) and its
consequences.
2.2. Family complexity
Early research on family businesses showed that families evolve over time and
through succession processes to develop into increasingly complex systems (Lansberg,
1999). This evolution raises new challenges such as ownership dilution, a reduction
in commitment to the business, divergence, invisible but deep faultlines and
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blockholder conflicts (Montemerlo, 2005; Vilaseca, 2002). These conflicts deplete the
firm’s ability to compete and undertake new projects (De Massis et al., 2013, 2014;
Mazzola et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2013), exerting a negative effect on firm perform-
ance, which Dyer (2006) calls the ‘family effect’.
The literature reports that, to a certain point, ownership dilution (i.e. a limited number
of family factions with a high proportion of wealth tied up in the business) is detrimental
to firm performance (De Massis et al., 2013; Mazzola et al., 2013; Miller, Le Breton, &
Lester, 2011). Similarly, having more generations means greater and more improper
involvement of family members in management, as well as deeper family embeddedness
(Miller et al., 2011) and pay dispersion amongst non-CEO top managers (Jaskiewicz et al.,
2017). Considering these arguments, Hypothesis 1 is proposed as follows:
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between family complexity (measured as the
number of generations and number of stakeholders) and firm performance.
To manage the risk associated with family complexity, Gimeno-Sandig et al. (2006,
2010) proposed a model of fit that links the degree of family complexity to the devel-
opment of a family regulatory framework and a family institutional structure (Berent-
Braun & Uhlaner, 2012; Suess, 2014). When both of these mechanisms fit with the
level of family complexity, the level of structural risk of the family business drops.
2.3. Family regulatory framework
The creation and deployment of rules regulating ownership and work in relation to the
family business are well-known ways of managing the owner family. These rules provide
protection against owner-owner agency costs (Arteaga & Menendez-Requejo, 2017),
develop and protect ‘familiness’ (Minichilli et al., 2010; Suess, 2014), regulate ownership
transmission without draining financial resources or reducing family control (Neubauer
& Lank, 2016), formalise communication processes, strengthen a shared commitment to
norms and values (Neubauer & Lank, 2016), shape the owner’s mindset, and provide
institutional legitimacy to the family and the business (Reay et al., 2015).
These rules cover three main areas: human resource policies for family members
(Kidwell et al., 2018), the presence of family members in managerial positions and
CEO succession (Chittoor & Das, 2007), and the valuation and transmission of stakes
(Villalonga et al., 2015). These family regulatory frameworks generally enhance cor-
porate governance and rules regarding the inclusion of family members in the com-
pany. This effect limits family managers’ opportunism and promotes
professionalisation, which in turn improves performance. In addition, a suitable fam-
ily regulatory framework increases feelings of procedural justice between family mem-
bers (Berghe & Carchon, 2003) and increases socioemotional wealth (SEW), which
positively influences performance (Hernandez-Perlines et al., 2020). Accordingly,
Hypothesis 2 is proposed as follows:
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between the family regulatory framework
and firm performance.
With regard to family complexity, multiple family owners from different genera-
tions are likely to differ in their financial and non-financial interests. This discrepancy
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potentially leads to family feuds and conflicts (Bertrand et al., 2008; Eddleston &
Kellermanns, 2007; Zellweger & Kammerlander, 2015) that can harm firm perform-
ance. However, owner family agreements that are formalised as rules prevent block-
holder conflicts. Therefore, we expect family complexity to have a less negative effect
on performance when the family regulatory framework is stronger. Consequently,
Hypothesis 3 is stated as follows:
Hypothesis 3: The negative relationship between family complexity and firm performance
is weaker when the family regulatory framework is stronger.
However not all family issues and challenges can be managed using a set of rules.
Certain matters need a family governance structure.
2.4. Family governance structure
The family governance structure refers to institutional arrangements to manage family
identity, harmony and wealth. The family governance structure is clearly separate
from the corporate governance and management of the family-owned firm (Aronoff
& Ward, 2016; Eckrich & McClure, 2012).
The literature identifies two core dimensions of the family governance structure.
The first dimension is wealth. A family office is a structure designed to professional-
ise wealth management and optimise profitability whilst reducing the financial risk
and tax burden (Naldi et al., 2015; Rivo-Lopez et al., 2017). The family office sepa-
rates the family from its wealth, reducing the risk of irresponsible altruistic tendencies
or wasteful financial behaviours (Miller et al., 2017).
The second family governance structure dimension has to do with family harmony
and unity of purpose. Institutional mechanisms such as the family assembly and the
family council are devoted to ensuring regular meetings between family members
(Gersick et al., 1997; Suess, 2014). The main function of these meetings is ‘to achieve,
maintain, and increase family members’ unity both among themselves and with their
family business’ (Gallo & Kenyon-Rouvinez, 2005, p. 53). The purpose of the family
assembly and family council has to do with cultivating trust and a shared vision
amongst family members (Gnan & Montemerlo, 2006) to enhance their emotional
commitment to and identification with the family and the firm (Bj€ornberg &
Nicholson, 2012). Similarly, the family assembly and family council improve family
communication (Labaki, 2011; Suess, 2014) and offer an orderly and structured
vehicle to convey the needs and expectations of the family with respect to the firm
(Aronoff & Ward, 2016; Eckrich & McClure, 2012; Nordqvist & Melin, 2010).
The family council should be a clearly differentiated family governance institution
whose aim is to preserve and enhance family harmony and unity of purpose (Poza,
2013). The function of a family council has to do with family unity and harmony
(Aronoff & Ward, 2016; Eckrich & McClure, 2012; Poza, 2013). From this perspec-
tive, the family council is the formal forum where the family builds an explicit set of
common values (Aronoff & Ward, 2016; Tapies & Fernandez-Moya, 2012) and prin-
ciples (Sundaramurthy, 2008) that govern intra-family interactions and family-firm
relationships. Trust, commitment, harmony, common intention and unity of purpose
form the foundations of a functional family that contributes to the firm (Aronoff &
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Ward, 2016; Chittoor & Das, 2007; Eckrich & McClure, 2012; Gnan & Montemerlo,
2006; Sundaramurthy, 2008; Vilaseca, 2002). Other authors have underlined the role
of the family council as a channel for the transfer of family values, mindset, identity
and intention towards the firm (Aronoff & Ward, 2016; Craig et al., 2008; Eckrich &
McClure, 2012; Nordqvist & Melin, 2010; Tapies & Fernandez-Moya, 2012).
With regard to the impact of family governance structure institutions on perform-
ance, the results are inconclusive. Some studies (e.g. De Massis et al., 2015) have
shown a negative but non-significant relationship between the family council and
gross profit margin. However, most of the evidence supports the positive effect
between family governance structure and firm success (Brenes et al., 2011) or finan-
cial performance (Arteaga & Menendez-Requejo, 2014, Suess-Reyes, 2017). Therefore,
the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between the family governance structure and
firm performance.
With regard to the interaction between the family governance structure and family
complexity, the family office and, especially, the family council minimise potential
conflicts due to family complexity (Arteaga & Menendez-Requejo, 2017; Cruz et al.,
2014; Vardaman & Gondo, 2014). The family governance structure promotes family
cohesion, which also minimises the negative effects of family problems on family firm
reputation (Arteaga & Menendez-Requejo, 2017; Vardaman & Gondo, 2014).
Furthermore, The family governance structure enhances stewardship behaviour by
promoting cohesion, values and open communication between family members
(Gallo & Kenyon-Rouvinez, 2005; Suess, 2014). The family governance structure con-
tributes to creating a favourable organisational environment (Chirico et al., 2011;
Sirmon et al., 2008). In such an environment, the family business can benefit from
the interactions and ties between family members that are necessary to take advantage
of the rich, diverse endowment of knowledge, relationships and competencies that a
complex family offers (Brenes et al., 2011; Umans et al., 2020). Considering these
findings, Hypothesis 5 is proposed as follows:
Hypothesis 5: The negative relationship between family complexity and firm performance
is weaker when the family governance structure is stronger.
2.5. Family governance as a system
Aronoff and Ward (2016, p. 6) define family governance simply but forcefully:
‘effective governance can be defined as creating processes that make revolution
unnecessary’. Thus, family governance should not only prevent and manage conflicts
today but also enable the smooth transition from generation to generation and
through the different stages of the family in the future.
The research underlines the role of the family regulatory framework, especially the
family constitution, as a safeguard against conflicts, harmful decisions and destructive
behaviours. This approach emphasises the concept of mutual accountability but overlooks
others that are equally important, such as understanding, acceptance and adherence.
These concepts provide the required sense of shared principles and aspirations amongst
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family members, as well as a sense of consistency and fairness. Therefore, a family regula-
tory framework requires a set of institutions and processes for interpretation, amendment
and adaptation to new realities and family members’ aspirations. Without the support of
this family governance structure, family constitutions become a ‘blue law’ – a
‘monument’ to the founder generation (Tait, 2019, p. 15).
Alderson (2015) reports the complementary functions of the family regulatory
framework and the family governance structure. The latter offers the appropriate
forum to interpret, develop and update the rules that regulate the relationship
between the family and the business. Similarly, the former is necessary to enable the
mechanism of the family governance structure (i.e. family meetings, assemblies, coun-
cils, committees and task forces) to operate smoothly and correctly. As Aronoff and
Ward (2011, p. 26) explain, ‘[o]nce family businesses make a positive transition to
organized governance procedures, governance has a way of taking care of itself’.
In terms of information processing theory, the family regulatory framework and the
family governance structure are complementary but non-substitutive structural solutions
to deal with family complexity. A family regulatory framework provides adequate struc-
tural mechanisms to manage limited uncertainty and routine challenges (Luo &
Donaldsen, 2013). It works on the premise that there is an agreement about core issues –
or at least an acceptance of a basic set of shared beliefs, values and principles – between
key family members to deal with a set of possible future events. In parallel, the family
governance structure is based on an institutional framework suitable for managing high
uncertainty and non-routine challenges (Luo & Donaldsen, 2013). Therefore, it is a
necessary structural capability to build basic agreements and develop a set of core beliefs,
values and principles that the family group must adhere to, or at least accept, to achieve
a unity of purpose. Accordingly, the family regulatory framework and the family govern-
ance structure complement each other but are not substitutive structural mechanisms.
Hence, an effective family governance system requires both internal fit between the fam-
ily regulatory framework and the family governance structure and external fit with con-
tingency (in this case, family complexity). In accordance with these arguments,
Hypotheses 6 and 7 are proposed as follows:
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive and complementary relationship of the family regulatory
framework and the family governance structure with firm performance.
Hypothesis 7: The positive and complementary relationship of the family regulatory
framework and the family governance structure with firm performance is stronger when
family complexity is higher.
In summary, Figure 1 graphically illustrates the research model and the pro-
posed hypotheses.
3. Data and variables
3.1. Databases
We used a database from a primary study of the Spanish tourism industry. The eco-
nomic activity of tourism is defined by the Spanish Institute of Tourism Studies
(Instituto de Estudios Turısticos) in their analysis of the Spanish Labour Force Survey
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(Encuesta de Poblacion Activa – EPA). The sample was selected from the entire popu-
lation of Spanish tourism companies appearing in the 2008 Central Companies
Directory (DIRCE) compiled by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE).
From a population of approximately 140,900 firms, we selected a sample of 8,148
companies. We used stratified random sampling with proportional allocation to
ensure the representativeness of the sample in terms of activity (considering five
groups), size (taking number of employees as a proxy of the size of the company)
and location. After various data cleansing processes, the fieldwork provided a sample
of 1,019 companies, with a confidence level of 95% and an error interval of ± 3.1%.
The resulting sample represented a response rate of 25.6%.
The research team gathered data through personal interviews with the firms’ CEO
or general manager. To address possible difficulties regarding surveys as a data collec-
tion method, we followed a set of recommended methods based on Dillman’s (1978)
Total Design Method for questionnaire-based research. The fieldwork lasted from
December 2009 to March 2010. The sample consisted of 271 non-family businesses
and 748 family businesses.
We gathered data on firm performance from 2008 to 2016 using the Sistema de
Analisis de Balances Ibericos (SABI), a database managed by Bureau Van Dijk and
Informa D&B, S.A. Because SABI does not offer complete financial information on
all interviewed companies, our final data set comprised 543 companies, of which 165
were non-family businesses and 378 were family businesses. This sample offered a
reasonable overall representation of the Spanish tourism sector. The sample covered
five tourism sub-sectors: accommodation, catering, intermediaries, transport and
complementary offer (Table 1).
3.2. Variables
In this section, we describe the variables used in the research model. To mitigate the
effect of outliers, we winsorised all variables at 0.5% of each tail of the distribution.
Figure 1. Research model and hypotheses. Source: own research.
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3.2.1. Dependent variable
Return on assets (ROA). The dependent variable, ROA, was defined as EBIT (earnings
before interest and taxes) divided by the book value of total assets (Amore, Garofalo
& Minchilli, 2014; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2008; Bouzgarrou & Navatte,
2013; Molly et al., 2010). Papers published in top academic journals propose ROA as
a reliable indicator to assess the impact of action by the owner family on the firm’s
capacity to generate economic performance.
3.2.2. Independent variables
Our independent variables were operationalised as indices based on proxies. These
were taken from data gathered in the 2009 survey. As in prior studies, our indices
were estimated by adding scores for every feature that was present in the surveyed
company (Ben-Amar et al., 2013; Gompers et al., 2003). Higher scores denote a
higher level of the index (Black et al., 2006).
Family complexity. The family complexity index was based on three proxies from our
survey. The first proxy was the percentage of equity held by the largest shareholder.
Following Ben-Amar et al. (2013), we divided the sample by the median of this proxy.
The variable took the value of 1 if the percentage of equity held by the largest share-
holder was below the median, and 0 otherwise. The second proxy was the dominant
generation. If the founder had the decision-making power, then the proxy took the
value 0. If it was the second generation, then it took the value 1. If it was beyond the
second generation, then it took the value 2. The third proxy was the number of fam-
ily shareholders in the company. Since this index refers to ownership dispersion, we
followed the indications provided by De Massis et al. (2013) and Wiklund et al.
(2013), who report an inverted U-shaped effect of ownership dispersion. In other
words, ownership concentration generates a positive effect on performance (Hoopes
& Miller, 2006). However, to some extent, property dispersion is harmful to business
performance. Beyond this point, additional dispersion has a positive impact on firm
performance, given that shareholders’ behaviour is similar to that of shareholders in
listed firms. Accordingly, if the number of family shareholders was 1, then the proxy
took the value 0. If the number was between 2 and 5, then it took the value 2. If the
number was between 6 and 20, then it took the value 1. Finally, if the number of
family shareholders was greater than 20, then it took the value 0.
Family regulatory framework. This variable depended on the number of agreements,
provisions and rules that the owner family had put in place. Examples include a family






Complementary offer 82 738
TOTAL 543 4,887
Source: own research.
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constitution, rules for new family members to join the firm or board, rules regarding the
family members’ duties in the company, rules for top manager succession, agreements
related to power distribution amongst different branches of the family, liquidity policies,
rules for stake transmission, and rules to transfer ownership to the next generation. The
index was designed as follows: if there was a formal rule, then the index took the value
1; if there was a verbal agreement, then it took the value 0.5.
Family governance structure. As with the preceding independent variable, this third
variable reflected the presence of family governance mechanisms such as structures to
organise family wealth, a family assembly, a family council and so on. If there was an
institutionalised device, the index took the value 1; if there was an informal structure,
then the index took the value 0.5. Additionally, we added a proxy to capture how
often the family assembly and the family council met. If they met two or more times
over the course of the year, then it took the value 1. Finally, we used a proxy to
assess the family council usefulness. We considered whether it allowed the exchange
of opinions, avoided conflicts, fostered family commitment with the company,
worked as a channel of information on the company for the family, organised joint
leisure activities, revised the family protocol, defined the rules for family members to
join the company, and set the financial policies to manage family wealth. The sample
was divided into terciles (Francoeur et al., 2008). If the family council assessment fell
into the first or second tercile, then the proxy variable took the value 1.
3.2.3. Control variables
The control variables in this study were size (natural logarithm of number of employ-
ees), age (natural logarithm of number of years since the creation of the firm), lever-
age (long-term plus short-term debt divided by the book value of equity), the firm’s
risk in terms of the Altman (1968) Z-Score, and investment (capital expenditure div-
ided by plant property and equipment). These control variables were considered in
accordance with previous research on family business performance (Andres, 2008;
Miller et al., 2007; 2011; Poutziouris et al., 2015).
Tables 2 and 3 show the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix, respectively.
The data show a significant correlation between age, size and family complexity. As
time passes, firm and family complexity grows. In any other case, when there is an
imbalance between firm and family complexity (‘too much family for so little com-
pany’), firm survival is probably at risk. Similarly, the family regulatory framework
and the family governance structure have a high correlation, suggesting the comple-
mentarity of these two elements.
A multicollinearity test was performed using the variance inflation factor (VIF).
Low VIF values in Table 3 suggest no collinearity between the variables. The multi-
variate analysis provides a more robust explanation of these correlations.
4. Method and results
To test the hypotheses, we used random effects generalised least squares (GLS) panel
regression based on the following model:
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ROAit ¼ b0 þ bk  FVit þ dk  CONit þ uk  SECit þ #k  YEARit þ eit þ li
In this model, FVit is the vector that includes the first, second and third order
moderations of the independent variables. The vector CONit represents the control
variables. The vector SECit represents the sector control variable. The term YEARit
denotes the year dummies. Finally, mi captures the individual random effect.
Given the stability of the family firm variables, random effects GLS is an appropri-
ate approach (Andres, 2008; Miller et al., 2011). We used robust Huber-White stand-
ard errors to account for unobserved firm fixed effects and firm-specific
autocorrelation (Miller et al., 2011).
4.1. Empirical results
Table 4 shows the results of the random effects GLS panel regression for the depend-
ent variable (ROA). As shown by the results for Model II, neither family complexity
nor family governance structure has a direct and significant impact on firm perform-
ance (ROA). Thus, Hypotheses 1 and 4 are not supported. For Hypothesis 4, the
results are in line with those reported by De Massis et al. (2015).
Model II shows that a well-developed family regulatory framework has a positive
and significant impact on firm performance (ROA). Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported.
Model III shows that managing an increasing level of family complexity through a
complex set of family rules (i.e. the family regulatory framework) has a negative and
significant impact on firm performance. However, when family complexity is non-
existent or low, a more complex set of family rules (i.e. the family regulatory frame-
work) has a positive and significant impact on ROA, in line with Hypothesis 2. These
results lead to the rejection of Hypothesis 3. The results reveal a significant relation-
ship but with the opposite sign to that proposed by this hypothesis.
Likewise, Model V shows that an increasing level of family complexity, along with
more complex family governance structures, has a negative but non-significant effect
on firm performance. Thus, Hypothesis 5 receives no support.
Model IV also shows that an increasing number of rules that regulate the family-
firm relationship, along with more developed and intensive use of family governance
structures, has a negative and significant relationship with firm performance.
Therefore, Hypothesis 6 is rejected.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
All firms
Variables Obs. Mean SD
ROA 3,584 0.0072 0.229
FC 2,142 2.483 1.219
FRF 4,887 0.711 1.605
FGS 4,887 0.476 0.645
SIZE 3,338 2.755 1.699
AGE 3,533 2.709 0.914
LEV 1,993 0.538 0.692
RISK 3,598 1.388 2.719
INV 2,718 0.465 1.7716
Source: own research.
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Finally, Model VI shows that, when the family business has increasing levels of
family complexity, an adequate combination of family governance structures and
rules that regulate the family-firm relationship (i.e. the family regulatory framework)
has a positive and significant impact on firm performance (ROA). Thus, Hypothesis
7 is supported.
Similarly, Model VI shows that a complete set of family rules (i.e. the family regu-
latory framework), together with a fully developed family governance structure, has a
negative and significant impact on ROA when family complexity is low. This situ-
ation is a typical case of over-fit. Therefore, the results for Model VI reinforce the
findings of Gimeno-Sandig et al. (2010) regarding the need for fit between family
complexity and the family governance system and the negative consequences of any
misfit, be it under-fit or over-fit.
The analysis of the coefficients in Table 4 regarding the interaction effects requires
the interpretation of the related plots (Cohen et al., 2003; Miller et al., 2013). The first
plot shows the interaction between family complexity and the family regulatory
framework (see Figure 2).
The second plot shows the interaction between family complexity, the family regu-
latory framework and the family governance structure (see Figure 2 and Figure 3).
As the first plot shows, when family complexity is low, a complete set of family
rules (i.e. the family regulatory framework) has a positive impact on ROA. Because
uncertainty about the adherence to, or at least acceptance of, basic family principles
is low or non-existent, rules offer the right structural device to deal with a set of fore-
seen family issues. On the contrary, when family complexity is high, an increasing
number of rules (i.e. the family regulatory framework) to manage family-firm rela-
tionships is not enough (Figure 2).
The second plot (see Figure 2 and Figure 3) shows that when family complexity is
high, a family regulatory framework without the right family governance structure
has a negative effect on firm performance. Because family complexity is high, basic
principles cannot be taken for granted. Therefore, a family governance structure is
necessary to communicate and discuss the letter and the spirit of the family laws,
interpreting and updating the family regulatory framework to adapt to new family
realities. Similarly, high family complexity requires an increasingly high degree of
institutionalisation in the form of a set of rules that regulate the operation of such
family governance mechanisms. Without this complementarity between the family
regulatory framework and the family governance structure, families cannot manage
high family complexity. Similarly, when family complexity is low, an excess of institu-
tionalisation (i.e. over-fit) in family governance structures has negative consequences.
Thus, the results show that any kind of misfit – be it over-fit or under-fit – is detri-
mental to firm performance.
4.2. Robustness of results
To check the robustness of our results, we performed several tests. First, we used
EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation) divided by
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total assets as an alternative dependent variable (Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013). The
results in Table 5 confirm our previous findings.
Second, to control for industry trends, we used a new dependent variable, which
was calculated as ROA minus the annual mean industry ROA (Amore et al., 2014).
Table 6 shows similar results to those reported previously.
Figure 2. Plots of significant interaction effects between family complexity and family regulatory
framework. Source: own research
16 T. GONZÁLEZ-CRUZ ET AL.
Figure 3. Plots of significant interaction effects: interaction of family complexity, family regulatory
framework and family governance structures. Source: own research.
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Finally, to test whether our results might be biased by endogeneity in the family
governance variables, we ran instrumental variable regressions (Andres, 2008,
Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013). As instruments, we used variables that have commonly
been used in the related literature (Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013, Miller et al., 2007;
Miller et al., 2013; Pindado et al., 2011; Schmid, 2013; Villalonga & Amit, 2006).
Specifically, we used sales growth (current sales less sales from the previous year, div-
ided by sales from the previous year), cash holdings (cash holdings divided by total
assets), and the average age of directors and outside blockholders (ownership percent-
age of all major non-family members with a holding of more than 5%). Hansen’s test
for overidentifying restrictions confirmed the validity of our instruments. The results
in Table 7 are similar to those in Table 4.
In line with the related literature (Anderson & Reeb, 2003, Andres, 2008), the
results of the instrumental variables method in Table 7 confirm our main findings
when controlling for the potential endogeneity of family governance variables.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The effect of family complexity on family firm performance has been the target of
study for the last decade. However, scant research has considered the direct impact of
rules that govern family-firm relationships and family governance structures on fam-
ily firm performance.
To fill this gap, the present study examined the impact of the family governance
framework and the family governance structure on performance. The study also
examined the complementarity between family rules and family institutions. This
research draws upon the concept of fit from organisation design and builds on the
model of fit proposed by Gimeno-Sandig et al. (2006, 2010). The analysis sheds light
on the consequences of fit and misfit – be it under-fit or over-fit – between family
governance and family complexity.
The results show that the relationship of family rules and institutions (i.e. the fam-
ily regulatory framework and the family governance structure) with family firm per-
formance (ROA) is contingent on family complexity. In other words, the level of
structural complexity of the regulatory framework and the institutions that govern
the family should fit the level of complexity of the owner family. Any misfit will lead
to a non-significant effect or, worse, a negative impact on firm performance (ROA).
When family complexity is low, a complete set of rules and agreements that regu-
late the relationship between the family and the firm (i.e. the family regulatory frame-
work) seems to be an adequate way of managing the preferences and aspirations of
the family group to improve firm performance (ROA). However, when the level of
family complexity is high, a complex set of rules (i.e. a complex family regulatory
framework) is not enough and may even be counterproductive. High family complex-
ity requires a well-developed regulatory framework supported by the right family gov-
ernance structure. These results show the complementary role and systemic
interdependence of family rules and family institutions. The family regulatory frame-
work provides obsolete laws without the family governance structure, whilst this
structure causes complete confusion without the right regulations.
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Finally, this research shows that both under- and over-fit are detrimental to family
firm performance. These results bring to the fore the need for family business
research to provide a better understanding of the range and diversity of family firms
and to show that family firms require suitable management and governance set-ups.
New research is also needed to identify the most suitable point in the family firm life
cycle at which to develop and deploy the family regulatory framework and family
governance structure. For this reason, consultancy and case-based research offer a
good starting point to support additional research.
This study is not without limitations. First, it focuses on a single industry and
country, so further research should seek to confirm the universal validity of our
results. Second, although the sample was large enough in statistical terms, its size was
still limited. Therefore, additional research with larger samples is required. Third, the
operationalisation of variables using indices creates an opportunity for future research
to look for methodological triangulation with new, alternative and more accurate
indices. Finally, dynamic studies based on panel data are also recommended.
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Table 7. Estimation results.
Explanatory variables Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
FC 0.003(0.0074) 0.002(0.024) 0.001(0.009) 0.015(0.029) 0.107(0.092)
FRF 0.006(0.003) 0.008(0.030) 0.017(0.020) 0.016(0.012) 0.065(0.089)





LEV 0.065(0.018) 0.068(0.019) 0.067(0.019) 0.075(0.026) 0.071(0.030)
SIZE 0.009(0.004) 0.010(0.004) 0.008(0.005) 0.011(0.005) 0.001(0.008)
INV 0.022(0.022) 0.0213(0.020) 0.022(0.019) 0.018(0.022) 0.013(0.027)
AGE 0.001(0.008) 0.002(0.008) 0.002(0.008) 0.002(0.008) 0.002(0.010)
RISK 0.038(0.008) 0.039(0.008) 0.039(0.009) 0.040(0.008) 0.041(0.009)
Constant 0.138(0.041) 0.113(0.088) 0.092(0.062) 0.149(0.104) 0.283(0.284)
Observations












Notes: instrumental variable regression coefficients estimated with robust standard errors in brackets; ROA (depend-
ent variable) ¼ EBIT divided by the book value of total assets; FC¼ family complexity; FRF¼ family regulatory frame-
work; FGS¼ family governance structure; SIZE¼ natural logarithm of total employees. AGE¼ natural logarithm of
the number of years since the creation of the firm; LEV¼ long-term plus short-term total debt divided by the book
value of equity; RISK¼Altman (1968) Z-score; INV¼ ratio of capital expenditure to plant property and equipment;
year and sub-sector dummies included but not reported; asterisks indicate statistical significance at 0.01(),
0.05() and 0.10() levels.
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